English: After discussing this proposal, we decided to hold peace negotiations only on the condition that the Basmachi hand over all their weapons.

But our comrades became so carried away with the idea of peace that not only top representatives of the Turkestan authorities went to Fergana for the talks, but even comrade Iorov went. The Basmachi treated them with great honor — according to local custom, they generously gifted the guests: some got robes, others a riding horse, others a cow with a calf. All this was done in a caricatured manner (mockingly exaggerated). Since then, peace negotiations never really stopped — but all were unsuccessful. The Basmachi gained a lot from these peace talks, because the population saw that Soviet power was treating the Basmachi as equals, which gave them even more authority in the eyes of the people. Especially since all the village population was in the hands of the Basmachi, they made wide use of these peace talks for propaganda purposes, while we held only the cities. The result was limited to a few rallies. From that point, the Basmachi movement began to take on an increasingly political character: with the appearance of Enver (referred to as “the commander”), they gained a commander-in-chief and defined political slogans. Now even in the Samarkand region, the Basmachi’s authority has grown so much that the population itself conducts conscription for them — mobilizing a certain number of young men from each village for service under their commanders. And, having devastated the Fergana region, the Basmachi are transferring their forces to the Samarkand region. These two — the richest regions, not only of Turkestan but perhaps all of Russia — are being destroyed and continue to be destroyed by bandit pressure, to which we ourselves gave a political face and raised their prestige in the eyes of the population.

Main mistakes in the fight against the Basmachi. I will not dwell too long here, but I’ll note that we made political and especially economic mistakes for the same reasons I’ve mentioned in every report.

I believe that in fighting the Basmachi, coordinated measures are absolutely necessary — economic, political, military, and Chekist — and here I’ll briefly touch on the main military-Chekist mistakes we’ve made.